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"MEDICOVER": A PROPOSAL FOR
NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE
Maxwell . Mehlmant
INTRODUCTION
On October 28, 2006, a group of health policy experts participated
in a workshop at Case Western Reserve University School of Law to
design a program to provide affordable health insurance for all
Americans. The result was "Medicover."
The discussion proceeded from seven working assumptions:
1. All Americans must have access to affordable health insurance.
2. The private sector by itself cannot provide this.
3. Nor can the states.
4. The more the government restricts private choice, the less
likely that a health insurance program will be adopted.
5. People dislike creating new bureaucracies.
6. The most efficient administrative system for health insurance is Medicare.
7. Any new program administered by Medicare must not interfere with the existing Medicare program.
The result was a program with the following key features:
1. Congress should create and Medicare should administer a
new federal health insurance program.
2. Health insurance under the program should be available to
anyone who wants or needs it.

t The workshop was made possible by the generosity of Peter Weinberger, a
member of the firm of Spangenberg, Shibley & Liber LLP and a graduate of Case
Western Reserve University School of Law, and by his fundraising efforts, which led
to support from the law firms of Baker Hostetler and Porter Wright Morris & Arthur
LLP. Additional funding was provided by the School of Law through the LawMedicine Center, which hosted the workshop. The author would like to thank Gary
Broadbent for his research assistance.
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3. While the new program should be administered by Medicare, it should not reduce the benefits of or the funding for
the current Medicare program.
4. The new program should be voluntary.
5. The new program should provide an adequate package of
basic benefits.
6. The new program should employ best practices to keep
costs down.
7. Those who can afford it should pay premiums, based on
ability to pay.
8. Those who cannot afford to pay full premiums should be
subsidized by the government.
9. States should be permitted to enroll their Medicaid beneficiaries in the program upon payment of suitable premiums.
10. Employers should be permitted to enroll employees in the
program upon payment of suitable premiums.
11. Since the new program would be administered by Medicare and would provide health insurance coverage, its
name would be "Medicover."
This Article provides a description of the events leading up to the
workshop, the discussion that took place, and the proposal that
emerged. The proposal is intended to be a discussion document rather
than a final product. It needs greater detail, a clearer sense of its costs
and financing mechanisms, and input from stakeholders. Nevertheless,
the workshop participants believe that Medicover may be a viable
option for helping to solve the current health care crisis.
I. THE CURRENT HEALTH CARE CRISIS
One of the gravest crises facing the United States today is the
state of our health care system. The facts are not in dispute: The price
of health care is increasing at almost three times the rate of inflation.'
Nearly 46 million Americans are uninsured, an increase of 6 million
since 2000.2 Fewer employers, the source of health insurance for most
Americans, are offering it to their employees. An additional 16
1 See Cynthia Smith et al., Trends, NationalHealth Spending in 2004: Recent Slowdown Led by PrescriptionDrug Spending, 25 HEALTH AFF. 186, 186, 193

(2006).

2 CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME,
POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2004 16

(2005), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/p60-229.pdf.
3 See Sherry A. Glied & Phyllis C. Borzi, The CurrentState of Employment-

MlEDICOVER

20071

million Americans are considered "underinsured" based on their high
out-of-pocket expenses relative to their incomes. 4 "[T]wo of five
Americans-insured and uninsured alike-have trouble paying their
medical bills or have accrued [significant] medical debt."5 People who
lack adequate health insurance have difficulty managing chronic
conditions and are much less likely to get preventive care. When they
do receive care, it is frequently in the emergency room, the most expensive form of primary care. Lack of health insurance leads to an
estimated 18,000 excess deaths each year.6 In addition, the impact of
this situation reaches far beyond the circumstances of any individual
family: a recent Commonwealth Fund study estimates that health
problems among working-age Americans and their families cost an
estimated $260 billion in lost productivity each year.7
At the same time, the United States is the only industrialized
country that lacks a comprehensive national health insurance program.
This demonstrates that providing affordable access to an adequate
package of health care benefits clearly is feasible. Jost's article offers
a number of explanations for why the U.S. has not followed the path
of the rest of the world:
Explanations tend to focus on five factors, each of which
seems to play a role, though commentators disagree on their
relative importance: U.S. political institutions; the U.S. social
culture and character; a weak left and the limited strength of
unions in the U.S.; the political power of provider and insurer
interest groups; and the strength of path dependency.8
Based Health Coverage, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 404 (2004).
4 Cathy Schoen et al., Insured But Not Protected: How Many Adults Are
Underinsured?, HEALTH AFF., June 14, 2005, http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/
content/long/hlthaff.w5.289/DC1; see also SARA R. COLLINS ET AL., THE
COMMONWEALTH FUND, GAPS IN HEALTH INSURANCE: AN ALL-AMERICAN PROBLEM

15, 20 (2006), availableat http://www.cmwf.org/usrdoc/Collinsgapshltins_920.pdf
(twenty-eight percent of all working-age adults reported being underinsured in 2005).
5 THE

COMMONWEALTH

FUND,

HEALTH

INSURANCE:

AN

OVERVIEW,

http://www.cmwf.org/General/Generalshow.htm?docid=318887 (last visited Mar.
13, 2007); see also MICHELLE M. DOTY ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, SEEING
RED: AMERICANS DRIVEN INTO DEBT BY MEDICAL BILLS

3 (2005), available at

http://www.cmwforg/usr-doc/837_Dotyseeingredmedical-debt.pdf.
6 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CARE WITHOUT COVERAGE: Too LITTLE, Too

LATE

163 (2002).
7 KAREN

DAVIS

ET AL.,

THE

PRODUCTIVITY AMONG U.S. WORKERS

COMMONWEALTH

FUND,

HEALTH

AND

4 (2005), available at http://www.cmwf.org/

usr-doc/856 Davis_ht_productivityUSworkers.pdf.
8 Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Why Can't We Do What They Do? National
Health Reform Abroad,32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 433, 437 (2004).
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Perhaps it would be desirable if these factors did not exist. But the
U.S. cannot solve its health care crisis by pretending that they do not.
These realities impose a number of constraints on the possible
solutions. A single-payer system is likely to be the cheapest and the
most equitable, which is why it is the model for most of the rest of the
world. But the private health insurance industry, which wields
enormous political power, is no more likely to allow itself to be
eradicated now than during the Clinton health reform initiative of the
early 1990s. Some large employers, moreover, believe that they can
obtain a better deal on group health benefits from private insurers than
from the government. Americans do not seem willing to deny
themselves the right to purchase health care on the private market.
Consequently, any proposal for solving the insurance crisis must
accommodate private insurance. Finally, Americans hate being forced
to do things by the government. They prefer to govern their own lives,
even if the decisions they make prove unwise or cause them harm.
These attitudes not only doom the creation of a single-payer
system, but also most proposals for government-run national health
insurance. Several Democrats have urged adoption of "Medicare-forAll," which would eliminate private health insurance and require
everyone to enroll in Medicare. 9 In August of 2006, Congressman
Stark introduced a bill to establish "Americare," which would require
all Americans to purchase a health insurance plan approved by the
government.' 0 Neither of these proposals stands much chance of being
adopted. Massachusetts recently passed a law creating a program to
insure all state residents. Governor Schwartzenegger has proposed a
similar plan for California. " The details of these programs have yet to
be worked out, and it is not clear if they will survive the need for
various restrictions and financing charges. In any event, the wide
disparities in state resources mean that many states will be unable to
afford a comparable system. Unless the nation is prepared to accept a
patchwork of state-by-state health insurance plans with significantly
different degrees of coverage, including some states that have no
programs at all beyond Medicaid, state action is not the solution.
9 United States National Health Insurance Act, H.R. 676, 109th Cong.
(2005); see also Robert Pear, The Health Care Debate: The Legislation; Bill Passed
by Panel Would Open Medicare to Millions of UninsuredPeople, N.Y. TIMEs, July 1,
1994, at A12.
10 AmeriCare Health Care Act of 2006, H.R. 5886, 109th Cong. (2006).
11Press Release, Governor of California, Gov. Schwarzenegger Tackles
California's Broken Health Care System, Proposes Comprehensive Plan to Help All
Californians
(Jan.
8, 2007), available at http://gov.ca.gov/index.php?/
press-release/5057/.
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A uniquely American approach might be to rely on the private
sector to solve the crisis. But the private sector has tried without
success to do this for the past fifty years. Community-rated, not-forprofit hospital and physician plans that emerged in the 1930s could
not compete with commercial, for-profit companies, which led to
fragmentary rather than population-wide insurance delivered at high
administrative cost. Employer-based group insurance filled the breach
in many cases but has become so expensive that it is being offered by
fewer and fewer firms, while small employers and self-employed
individuals are priced out of the health insurance market unless their
risk factors make them unlikely to require health care in the first
place. In the 1980s and '90s, the private sector experimented with
managed care to restrain spending, which essentially shifted insurance
risk from insurers to providers. This failed when health care
professionals and their patients resisted attempts by managed care
plans to place them in an adversarial relationship in order to constrain
the consumption of health care services. The latest effort by the
private sector is "consumer-driven health care." The theory is that
health care costs can be controlled by making "consumers," i.e.,
patients, pay a significant portion of their health care expenses,
thereby giving them an incentive to be frugal. This is merely another
attempt by third-party payers to shift risk away from themselves, with
the bizarre twist that it is now the patients themselves, rather than
insurers, employers, or health care professionals, who are expected to
make wise purchasing decisions. Yet, no one has explained how
patients-especially those who are seriously ill-have the knowledge,
expertise, time, and emotional fortitude to make such choices, and the
result is bound to be a health policy disaster. The only explanation
offered by the private sector for this succession of failures is
goverment interference: If its hands had not been tied by government
regulation, the market would have been more successful. But in this,
market proponents make the same error as advocates of a single-payer
system-the nation is no more likely to eliminate public constraints
on the private sector than it is to eliminate the private sector itself.
Against this backdrop, the options for effective change are limited, but they do exist. What is necessary is a voluntary, federally-run
program that assures patients an adequate package of affordable
health care services, keeps administrative costs low, and controls costs
without making physicians adversaries toward their patients.
This rules out one often-made suggestion: that the federal employee health insurance program be made available to persons who
are not federal employees. This program is not run by the federal government but by private insurance companies such as Blue Cross/Blue
Shield. It does not provide an adequate package of services, and the
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scope of coverage is constantly shrinking. It does not effectively control its costs, despite utilizing a full range of cost control techniques.
Consequently, premiums are constantly rising.
One option would be to create a new government bureaucracy to
administer this program. This was the thrust of the Clinton health reform initiative. It planned to establish an extensive set of new agencies at both the state and federal level. This feature was seized upon
by opponents, chiefly the private health insurance industry, as too
much government and was one of the main reasons the initiative
failed. People do not like big bureaucracies, and they especially do not
like to create new ones.
Fortunately, there is no need to. Unquestionably, the best-run insurance program in the country is Medicare. Its administrative costs
are the lowest, averaging approximately three to six percent, as com12
pared with an average of twelve to thirteen percent for private plans.
Its beneficiaries are generally highly satisfied with how it functions.
The only significant administrative problems with Medicare have occurred in connection with the new Part D drug plan, and this is due to
Congress's misguided attempt to delegate the bulk of the administrative responsibilities to private insurers.
The workshop, therefore, concentrated on designing a new, federal health program open to all Americans and administered by Medicare.
II. WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS
In addition to myself, the following experts participated in the
workshop:
of
o Timothy S. Jost, Robert L. Willet Family Professor
13
Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law.
12 JEFF LEMIEUX, CTR. FOR POLICY & RESEARCH, AM.'S HEALTH INS. PLANS,
PERSPECTIVE:

ADMINISTRATIVE

COSTS

OF PRIVATE

HEALTH

INSURANCE PLANS,

(last visited
http://www.ahipresearch.org/pdfs/AdministrativeCosts_030705.pdf
Mar. 14, 2007) (noting that Medicare's low administrative costs of three to six percent may not be comparable to the private sector for various reasons, including the
fact that the administrative costs do not include the cost of capital to service Medicare, which alone might increase the actual cost by about seven percent).
13 Professor Jost was named Willett Professor of Law in 2001. Earlier, he
was Newton D. Baker, Baker & Hostetler Chair of Law and Professor at the College
of Medicine and Public Health at Ohio State University. From 1987 through 1992, he
was a member of the Ohio State Medical Board. He is an expert on comparative
health law and author of numerous articles and books, including: TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS
JOST, HEALTH CARE COVERAGE DETERMINATIONS: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE

STUDY (2004), Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Our Broken Health Care System and How to

MEDICOVER
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Theodore Marmor, Ph.D., Professor of Public Policy and
Management,
Professor of Political Science, Yale Univer14
sity.

*

Marilyn Moon, Ph.D., Vice President and Director of the
Health Program, American Institutes for Research. 5

* J.B. Silvers, Ph.D., Elizabeth M. & William C. Treuhaft
Professor of Health Systems Management, Professor,
Banking and Finance, Weatherhead School
of Manage6
ment, Case Western Reserve University.'
Fix It, 41 Wake Forest L. Rev. 537 (2006), and Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Why Can't We
Do What They Do? National Health Reform Abroad, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 433
(2004).
14 Professor Marmor's scholarship focuses on welfare state politics
and policy in North America and Western Europe, with emphasis on major spending programs. He authored THEODORE R. MARMOR, THE POLITICS OF MEDICARE (Aldine
Transaction, 2d ed., 2000) and, with Mashaw and Harvey, THEODORE R. MARMOR ET
AL., AMERICA'S MISUNDERSTOOD

WELFARE STATE: PERSISTENT MYTHS, ENDURING

REALITIES (1990). Author or co-author of eleven books, Professor Marmor has pub-

lished over a hundred articles in scholarly journals. Professor Marmor began his career as a special assistant to Wilbur Cohen (Secretary of HEW) in the 1960s. He was
Associate Dean of Minnesota's School of Public Affairs, on the University of Chicago faculty, the head of Yale's Center for Health Services, a member of President
Carter's Commission on the National Agenda for the 1980s, and a senior social policy
advisor to Walter Mondale during the 1984 Presidential campaign. Professor Marmor
received his Bachelor's Degree from Harvard College in 1960 and his Ph.D. from
Harvard University in 1966.
15Marilyn Moon is a nationally-known expert on Medicare. She has also
served as a Senior Fellow at the Urban Institute and as a public trustee for the Social
Security and Medicare trust funds. Dr. Moon has written extensively on health policy,
both for the elderly and the population in general, and on social insurance issues. Her
most recent book, MARILYN MOON, MEDICARE: A POLICY PRIMER (2006), was published by the Urban Institute Press in 2006. From 1993 to 2000, Moon also wrote a
periodic column for the Washington Post on health reform and health coverage issues.
She has served on a number of boards for non-profit organizations and is currently
President of the board of the Medicare Rights Center and is a board member for the
National Academy of Social Insurance. She is a member of the Institute of Medicine
of the National Academy of Sciences. Dr. Moon earned a Ph.D. in economics from
the University of Wisconsin-Madison, where her work focused on the health and
economic status of the elderly. Previously, she has been an associate professor of
economics at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, a senior analyst at the Congressional Budget Office, and the founding Director of the Public Policy Institute of
the American Association of Retired Persons.
16 J.B. Silvers has been on the Weatherhead faculty since 1979. He is also
Professor of Epidemiology & Biostatistics at Case Western Reserve University
School of Medicine. Professor Silvers teaches health finance, strategic financial management and value creation, and health policy and management decisions. His research focuses on health finance/insurance, pharmaconomics, mergers, and public
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Joseph White, Ph.D., Chair, Department of Political Science, Luxenberg Family Professor of Public Policy, Director of the Center
for Policy Studies, Case Western Reserve
7
1
University.

III. ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF A MEDICOVER
PROGRAM
The two days of discussion during the workshop centered on a
number of key issues. What benefits should Medicover provide?
Should the program impose the same limits on benefits as the Medicare program? If not, what effect would this have on Medicare itself?.
What would Medicover cost, and how would it be financed? How
would the program control costs? How serious a problem would be
posed by adverse selection, and how can it be prevented? Could
Medicover compete effectively with private insurers? How should
Medicover relate to employer-based health insurance? To Medicaid?
What political realities would confront a Medicover proposal, and is it
politically feasible?
Given the limited amount of time available during the workshop,
few of the issues can be said to have been discussed fully, much less
resolved. What follows is a summary of the discussion. Numbers in
parentheses are references to pages of the official transcript of the
policy. His book chapter, The Role of the Capital Markets in Restructuring Health
Care, appeared in PETER J. HAMMER ET AL., UNCERTAIN TIMES: KENNETH ARROW AND
THE CHANGING ECONOMICS OF HEALTH CARE 156 (2003). He is the author of numerous scholarly articles on business and epidemiology. Professor Silvers received his
B.S in Engineering (1965) and his M.S.I.A. (1966) from Purdue University. In 1971,
he earned a Ph.D. from Stanford University. He serves on a number of boards for
medical organizations, including the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (Oakbrook Terrace, Illinois).
7 Dr. Joseph White received his A.B. from the University of Chicago and
M.A. and Ph.D. from the University of California, Berkeley. Dr. White's research has
focused on American federal budget politics and policies; health care finance policy
and politics; and "reform" of Social Security and Medicare. Among his books are
JOSEPH WHITE, FALSE ALARM: WHY THE GREATEST THREAT TO SOCIAL SECURITY AND
MEDICARE IS THE CAMPAIGN TO "SAVE" THEM (2001) and JOSEPH WHITE, COMPETING
SOLUTIONS: AMERICAN HEALTH CARE PROPOSALS AND INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE

(1995). He authored the entry on NationalHealth Care & Insurance Systems in the
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 1029910303 (2001) and the entry on The Cost of Health Care in Western Countries in
EDWARD J. BENZ, OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE (4th ed. 2003).
Also participating in the workshop was William J. Scanlon, Ph.D., Senior
Policy Advisor, Health Policy R&D, who provided an introductory presentation on
financing and cost issues and contributed to the discussion based on his experience
with Medicare administration and payment policies.
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workshop proceedings. The final section of this report identifies the
numerous questions that remain.
One aspect of the workshop is striking, however. Relatively little
concern was expressed about how Medicover would be financed and
whether the nation could afford its price tag. In part, this is attributable to the preliminary nature of the proposal and the time limitations
of the workshop. But more fundamentally, it reflects a consensus
among the participants that the time is long past for this country to
provide affordable health insurance for all. If every other advanced
country can afford do so, so can we, the wealthiest country of all.
Surely difficult questions remain about the extent to which employers
would be expected to finance premiums for employees, how much
individuals would be required to contribute on behalf of themselves
and their families, and the nature and size of any necessary tax increases. One way or another, answers to these questions must be
found. To some extent, as Professor Jost explained during the workshop, they can be gleaned from the experience of other countries. But
the question can no longer be whether we can afford a national health
insurance alternative. The only question now must be how.
A. What Benefits Should Medicover Provide?
One of the key features identified in advance for the Medicover
program is that it "should provide an adequate package of basic benefits." Mindful of cost concerns, some health policymakers have advocated the creation of an inexpensive, bare-bones health insurance option for the uninsured. But the solution to the health insurance crisis
should not be to create more people who are under-insured. The goal
of Medicover should be to meet the needs of both the uninsured and
the underinsured. The workshop agreed that a meaningful health insurance alternative must provide a comprehensive benefits package,
including inpatient and outpatient care, physician and ancillary services, drugs and durable medical equipment, and home and hospice
care.
Another issue tackled by the workshop participants was the need
for Medicover to place a cap on individual out-of-pocket spendingoften referred to as a "catastrophic cap" since it is likely to be triggered by an expensive, catastrophic episode of illness. Medicare has
no such cap. Due to deductibles, co-insurance, co-payments, premiums, and lifetime limits, the average Medicare beneficiary currently
pays about forty-five percent of his or her health care costs out-ofpocket (207). The closest thing to caps under Medicare is the ability to
deduct health care expenditures from federal income taxes if they exceed seven and a half percent of adjusted gross income and to qualify
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for Medicaid once the individual has exhausted virtually all of his or
her assets. Many Medicare beneficiaries become impoverished as a
result. In contrast, the German system pays all health care costs once
individual spending exceeds two percent of income. The workshop
participants did not specify what the Medicover cap should be but
agreed that one was necessary.
There was considerable discussion about whether or not to include
Part C of Medicare in Medicover. Part C, originally called Medicare+Choice and now "Medicare Advantage," was added in 1997 as
an effort to privatize Medicare by permitting beneficiaries to contract
with private health insurance plans for their Medicare benefits. Part C
authorizes both managed care plans and private versions of the traditional Medicare fee-for-service approach. The workshop participants
strongly felt that Part C should not be included in Medicover because
its plans fail to achieve the administrative savings of the Medicare
program itself (409).
Finally, the workshop participants mentioned the need to consider
whether Medicover would provide long-term care (nursing home)
benefits but did not discuss the issue in detail (412).
B. What Would Medicover Cost?
As noted above, there was relatively little concern about whether
Medicover would be affordable. Nor did the workshop make a serious
attempt to calculate how much the program would cost. One participant estimated its cost at between $40 and $70 billion a year, but only
if all current expenditures for the uninsured, including the money
spent on community health clinics and uncompensated care, and the
funds that providers recoup by shifting the costs of the uninsured to
the insured, could be captured and the funds added to the Medicover
budget. But the participants acknowledged that this would be extremely difficult to achieve (425-26). One heartening point about costs
was the observation that public programs already provided coverage
for the most expensive patient population, namely, Medicare beneficiaries (291). This segment of the population
accounts for seventeen
8
percent of total health care spending.'
C. How Would Medicover Contain Costs?
A key feature of Medicover would be the use of "best practices"
to control costs. The workshop participants agreed that Medicover
18 THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FoUND., MEDICARE: MEDICARE SPENDING
AND FINANCING (2005), availableat http://www.kff.org/medicare/upload/7305.pdf.
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needed to do a better job of containing costs than Medicare, but time
constraints did not permit an extensive discussion of what cost controls should be employed. Participants noted the need for limitations
on both the price and the volume (or "intensity") of services, since, as
the experience with Medicare's efforts to restrain physician payments
has shown, fee limits alone cannot check spending (412). An additional type of cost control would be restrictions on Medicover expenditures, such as annual global budgets for providers or payment adjustments based on targeted rates of growth. There was also discussion of the need for limitations on coverage, including requiring that
new, costly technologies demonstrate not only that they are safer or
more effective than existing alternatives, but that they are more costeffective, that is, that they are the least expensive means to achieve a
desired outcome. Moreover, unlike Part D, the new Medicare drug
benefit, Medicover should have the authority to negotiate prices with
drug manufacturers, which most likely would require use of a drug
formulary to limit access to drugs whose manufacturers refused to
give the program a sufficient discount on price.
D. How Would Medicover Be Financed?
The workshop addressed a number of elements of Medicover financing. Individuals would pay premiums on the basis of ability to
pay (421). Premiums would be subsidized for those who could not
afford to pay the full premium but effectively also for those who were
ill or at high risk of illness and who, therefore, could not afford to pay
the high premiums that they would be charged by private insurers
(257). There was considerable debate about whether premiums should
be set according to a person's income or some other measure, such as
wealth (252). The former is administratively simpler but less progressive, favoring persons with large amounts of non-income-generating
assets. It was noted that both Medicaid and Part D of Medicare employ asset tests (394). One option is to place a ceiling on how much
income or wealth would be counted for purposes of calculating Medicover premiums, similar to the cap on income for paying FICA taxes
(260).
There was interest in the capitalized system used in Germany, in
which an individual's premiums are placed in an interest-bearing account so that they decline over time. If individuals were required to
pay deductibles, co-payments, or co-insurance, these should be assessed on a lump-sum basis rather than piecemeal for each type of
care, as under Medicare, and the amount of cost sharing should vary
on the basis of the patient's ability-to-pay (423-24). There was discus-
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sion of the problem of insuring illegal aliens, but no solution offered
(387).
E. Adverse Selection
One of the most troublesome threats to a voluntary program like
Medicover is adverse selection. This occurs when individuals refrain
from purchasing insurance until they are ill and then drop it once they
recover. It also occurs when individuals or firms drop private insurance in order to take advantage of premium subsidies under the public
program. The more this occurs, the more those paying full premiums
under Medicover will be persons requiring health care and the less it
will be healthy individuals whose premiums can help pay for that
care. Adverse selection is a dynamic effect in that premiums increase
as the proportion of enrollees who require health care increases, which
in turn drives up premiums even further. This phenomenon, known as
the insurance death spiral, ultimately destroys the insurance plan because insureds pay for their care in full.
Medicover will face this threat so long as enrollment is voluntary.
Healthy individuals either will not purchase health insurance at all or
will obtain more favorable rates from private plans. The only people
who will enroll in Medicover are those who cannot afford private insurance or who would have to pay more for private insurance than for
Medicover.
The classic solution to the problem of adverse selection is to require everyone to be insured under the program, but this violates the
basic objective that Medicover should be voluntary. So does the partial response of requiring everyone to have some form of health insurance. One other approach is to make people help finance Medicover
whether or not they enroll. Enrollment in Medicover would remain
voluntary but paying for it would not. This is similar to the Australian
system (235). Another alternative is the German system of capitalized
premiums, mentioned earlier, where the longer individuals delay enrolling, the higher their premiums will be. In order to discourage people from enrolling in Medicover when they need health care and then
dis-enrolling when they become well, Medicover could also emulate
the German system, which prevents persons from re-enrolling in the
public health insurance program once they leave it (199).
Another problem created by making Medicover voluntary is the
risk that lower-wage employers who previously helped pay for health
insurance for their employees will cease to do so in the expectation
that their employees will obtain subsidized coverage under Medicover. This may be less of a problem in the future as fewer low-wage
employers provide health insurance to their employees, but it will still
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be a threat. The solution again is either to make employers pay for
Medicover whether or not they provide it to their employees or at least
to require some payment by employers who drop private insurance
once Medicover becomes available.
On the other hand, the workshop participants acknowledged that it
is difficult, if not impossible, to predict the amount of adverse selection that would occur or its impact on the financial viability of a
Medicover program. The workshop participants, therefore, decided
that, rather than establish mechanisms in advance to deal with adverse
selection that might turn out not to be a serious problem, it made more
sense to require the program to monitor the problem and take steps to
reduce it in the future if they became necessary (401).
F. Cherry-Picking
Another basic premise of Medicover is that it would provide an
alternative to, rather than a replacement for, private health insurance.
This leaves the private sector free to "cherry-pick," that is, to offer
low-cost plans to healthy segments of the population, thereby drawing
these groups away from the Medicover pool of insureds. In a sense,
this makes Medicover a high-risk pool, insuring those who are not
sufficiently profitable for the private sector.
The workshop participants had no problem with the private sector
selling supplemental insurance to Medicover enrollees for items and
services that Medicover did not cover and, since Medicover itself presumably would pay for all medically necessary care, participants saw
no need for the premiums for these policies to be subsidized for those
less able to pay (416). However, it might be necessary for the government to limit and standardize the supplemental policies that could
be sold to prevent the confusion and duplication of coverage that
characterized the market for Medigap policies prior to government
intervention (415).
One way to deal with cherry-picking would be to require private
plans to help finance Medicover. Another approach, which was part of
the Clinton reform proposal, would be to subsidize private plans in
return for insuring higher-risk individuals. As in the case of adverse
selection, however, the degree and effect of cherry-picking cannot be
ascertained in advance. It is quite possible that enough people will
enroll in Medicover that it would have enough purchasing power to
compete effectively with smaller private plans by negotiating price
discounts from providers. Therefore, the participants agreed that
Medicover should monitor cherry-picking and only adopt mechanisms
to deal with it if it became problematic.
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G. Employers
Employers would be permitted to buy Medicover for their employees. There was extensive discussion of how to calculate employer
premiums. Experience-rating was rejected on the basis that it would
discourage employers from hiring employees with disabilities or other
high-risk factors (383). But participants thought that rates could vary
according to the sex and age of employees and the type of industry. If
an employer provided Medicover, it would have to cover all employees (402). Employees could be required to pay a portion of the premiums by having it deducted from their wages (271). The workshop
considered, but did not resolve, whether Medicover should employ a
play-or-pay type of mandate in which employers who did not enroll
their employees would have pay a Medicover tax to help finance
Medicover.
H. Medicare
A core objective of Medicover is that it is not seen as a threat to
the current Medicare program, lest it excite opposition from powerful
lobbying groups representing seniors. Accordingly, the financing for
Medicover should not come from resources that are necessary to sustain Medicare. As the workshop unfolded, however, it became clear
that a number of recommendations were being put forward that would
render Medicover more generous in certain respects than Medicare
(415 ff.). These included placing a limit on the amount of out-ofpocket expenditures by enrollees and subsidizing enrollees who could
not afford to fully pay deductibles, co-payments, and co-insurance.
Ideally, these features would be added to Medicare. But the participants were cognizant that budget concerns might make that unrealistic, in which case Medicover would face pressure to abandon these
features despite their desirability.
I. Medicaid
States should be permitted to terminate their Medicaid programs
in favor of enrolling Medicaid-eligibles in Medicover. In that case, the
state would transfer its Medicaid budget to the Medicover program,
while the federal government would transfer to Medicover what it
would have contributed to pay for the former state program.
J. Political Realities
No health reform proposal is a good proposal if it does not stand a
chance of being adopted. The Medicover proposal contains a number
of features that some might not regard as ideal, such as being volun-
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tary and not being accompanied by an individual or employer health
insurance mandate. Medicover is not a single-payer system. It is an
incremental change. At best, it will not solve the entire problem posed
by the lack of universal health insurance.
These ostensible shortcomings are part of the proposal for a reason, however. They are intended to give the proposal a chance at life.
At the least, the workshop participants felt that the proposal deserves
to be developed further and to play a role in the growing national debate that will culminate in calls for action during coming presidential
elections.
The workshop was heartened by the lessons from abroad. Medicover has analogues throughout the world. Typically, countries have
moved toward universal health insurance incrementally, and, characteristically, they have relied on a combination of public and private
insurance in doing so.
The concluding session of the workshop explored the political
landscape for health insurance reform and how Medicover would fare
in the political arena. One source of opposition is bound to be the drug
industry, which will feel threatened by the prospect of lower drug
prices as the result of Medicover's negotiating strength. Yet it is likely
that by the time Congress addresses Medicover, Medicare itself will
have been given the authority to negotiate drug prices under Part D.
The major opposition to Medicover would come from the private
health insurance industry and from market advocates who reject government as the solution to the health insurance crisis. One of the key
objectives of making Medicover voluntary is to blunt the objections of
private insurers. Medicover will not force anyone to abandon private
insurance and, unless it turns out to be necessary down the road, will
not interfere in any way with the ability of private insurers to offer
better terms to segments of the population at lower risk for ill health.
Those who promote competition as the way to restrain prices can consider Medicover as a means of injecting a dose of real competition
into the health care system. If private insurers compete effectively,
they will continue to thrive. However, it will be clear to the private
sector that Medicover may grow sufficiently large that it gains far
greater bargaining power than individual private insurers. Eventually
Medicover may "crowd out" much of the private insurance sector.
Opposition from that sector may be somewhat weakened by some of
Medicover's features, but it will still be fierce.
It is critical, therefore, that the Medicover proposal garners the
support of interest groups powerful enough to offset its opponents.
Unfortunately, those who would most benefit from such a programthe un- and under-insured-lack an organized political voice. The one
exception is self-employed individuals, who wield influence through
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various independent and small business trade associations (447). Support for Medicover may come from unions, who may see it as a partial
solution to the loss of employment-based health benefits (446). Organized social progressives would be supportive if they were willing
to set aside their preference for more comprehensive change. Fiscal
conservative groups might get behind the proposal if they felt that it
would help rein in health care spending (349). Other potential key
allies are health care providers. The question is whether they would be
frightened off by Medicover's cost controls or would see the program
as a source of greater revenues by financing access to health care for
patients who do not now receive adequate services or cannot pay for
them (307).
A final key source of support for Medicover, however, could be
large employers (343). They might endorse the program if they
viewed it as a cost-effective method of promoting a healthy workforce
and as the best way to avoid more draconian insurance mandates. It,
therefore, is critical that large employers be part of the coalition that
designs and backs the proposal.
IV. WHERE TO GO FROM HERE
The October 2006 workshop was only the first step in what has to
be an extended process. It has produced the bare bones of a proposal,
to which critical details must now be added. Among the details are
such central features as how Medicover would be financed, how it
would control spending, and how much it can be expected to cost.
It is also noteworthy that the workshop presenters were all health
policy experts rather than stakeholder representatives. None were
physicians, hospital administrators, or health insurers (although one
person, J.B. Silvers, had previously served as the chief executive of a
managed care plan). There were no business owners, union officials,
or corporate officers. These stakeholders now need to be brought into
the process so that their suggestions are considered and their objections noted and, ideally, addressed.
The next steps, thus, are clear: to continue to flesh out the Medicover program and to present a more complete plan to a convocation
of key constituents. In the meantime, you can play a role by directing
any comments or suggestions to me at The Law-Medicine
Center, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, 11075 East
Boulevard, Cleveland, Ohio 44106, or e-mail me at mjml0@case.edu.

